Western Kentucky University
From the SelectedWorks of Ann K. Ferrell

2013

Burley: Kentucky Tobacco in a New Century
Ann K. Ferrell, Western Kentucky University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/ann-ferrell/1/

Introduction

“Would you rather have
present day or olden days?”
Tradition and Transition in Kentucky
Burley Tobacco Production
Frequently over the past decade, I have heard Kentucky natives
comment with sadness on the changing landscape of their home
state: the countryside of childhood will soon be gone. The links
between land and culture, sense of place, history, and identity have
been widely acknowledged.1 According to Lucy Lippard, “The
intersections of nature, culture, history, and ideology form the
ground on which we stand—our land, our place, the local.”2 Such
intersections, of course, are neither inherent in the land itself nor
static. We form the ground on which we stand through our use of it
and as we come to view it not just as land but as landscape. Gregory Clark argues, “Land becomes landscape when it is assigned the
role of symbol, and as symbol it functions rhetorically.”3 It is precisely because landscapes symbolize something about who we are
that shifting landscapes often result in feelings of loss. The source
of the sense of loss expressed by so many Kentuckians is not the
expected—the loss of land to the proliferation of subdivisions and
“big-box” retail stores, although certainly many bemoan such development. This sense of loss follows observations that the tobacco
fields are disappearing.
It is difficult for many to understand the loss of tobacco—a
crop that has come to symbolize addiction, disease, and a deceptive industry—as lamentable. However, this loss has vast economic
and cultural consequences for farming communities, as well as for
1
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the state as a whole. Tobacco was once Kentucky’s largest cash crop,
and although other types of tobacco are grown in the state, historically over 90 percent of the tobacco grown in Kentucky has been
burley tobacco.4 The crop has been an important symbol of regional
identity, and the changing landscape symbolizes a shift to a “brave
new world”5 in which King Burley no longer reigns and the future is
uncertain—both economically and symbolically. I came to this project thinking that it would somehow be possible to conduct research
with tobacco farmers disconnected from tobacco products. I found
that not only is that not possible but that the interconnections are
central to the story. This book is premised on the idea that the stories of tobacco farmers and of burley tobacco in Kentucky must be
understood not separate from but within the context of the changing
meanings of the crop.
In the interwoven process of collecting and interpreting the material that forms the basis of this book, I bring together my training
as a folklorist with the theory and methods of the field of rhetoric, particularly the work of Kenneth Burke.6 In bringing the two
together, not only do I view the performance of traditional cultural
practices as persuasive and attempt to understand the rhetorical
force of the usage of terms such as tradition and heritage, but I
also investigate the interactions between the performance of cultural practices and public discourses about such practices. “Public
discourses” have been examined in a range of fields, often involving questions of what constitutes public and how various media
produce, sustain, change, or limit understanding of an issue. In his
rhetorical reading of American tourist landscapes, Gregory Clark
defines “public discourse” as “the ongoing process of inquiry and
exchange that is sustained by people who constitute . . . community.”7 Clark understands public discourses not only as “tak[ing]
the form of print and speech” but also as “experiences not immediately discursive at all.”8 My interest is in the emerging and evolving discourses surrounding tobacco farming in the context of other
public discourses on tobacco, such as those related to smoking,
health, and disease, as well as those related to farming more generally, such as increasing calls in recent years for the procurement
and consumption of foods grown by local farmers. This requires
an understanding of the historical conditions in which these multiple discourses have emerged and the ways in which they compete.
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It also requires an understanding of the discourses of tobacco
farmers.
This book is the result of the collection of two kinds of data,
broadly speaking. First, I rely on data that I gathered through ethnographic fieldwork primarily in central and northern Kentucky, the
center of burley tobacco production. Research began on this project in 2005, with intensive fieldwork during the 2007 crop year—
January 2007 through February 2008. During this period, I spent
time on farms, observing and at times participating in tobacco production. I conducted one or more recorded interviews with over sixty
farmers, warehousemen, and agricultural professionals, and I visited
the farms of and had conversations with many others. In addition to
my own interviews, with the support of a grant from the Kentucky
Oral History Commission (KOHC), I fully transcribed thirty-three
recorded interviews conducted by John Klee and Lynne David for
the KOHC between May 2000 and February 2002 with farmers,
agriculture professionals, and policy makers. I attended agricultural
events such as trainings, meetings, and field days, and I visited public and private sites related to tobacco once it leaves the farm, such
as one of the last remaining burley tobacco warehouses, tobacco
receiving stations (where farmers now sell their crop), and a redrying facility (where tobacco is processed before it is shipped to manufacturing facilities). I also worked in the tobacco exhibit area of the
Kentucky Folklife Festival in 2005 and 2007, interpreting tobacco
traditions for visitors alongside farmers, interacting with and observing visitors to the tobacco tent, and conducting interviews both on
and off stage.
Second, throughout the period of my research I have observed
and collected (both systematically and serendipitously) public discourses from a wide range of oral, print, and electronic sources. I
spent many days in the Kentucky Department for Libraries and
Archives, reading the newsletters of the Kentucky Department
of Agriculture, and I collected published materials—books, pamphlets, brochures, booklets, fliers, posters, and policy and statistical documents—about tobacco history and production from a
range of sources, including tobacco industry lobbying and marketing organizations, tobacco companies, the state and federal government, research institutions, and farm organizations. During my
time in the field, I read the major Kentucky newspapers on a daily
basis, I utilized online databases to locate media coverage in past
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Introduction   5
periods, and I regularly visited and studied a number of websites,
particularly those of state-sponsored agriculture agencies and farm
organizations.
In a caveat meant to explain how his book The Written Suburb:
An American Site, An Ethnographic Dilemma departs from “conventions of ‘traditional’ ethnographic documentation,” John Dorst
describes such documentation as “an attempt to ‘get close to,’ to
understand and to describe the culture, values or world view of a
certain set of people.”9 This was the task of my ethnographic fieldwork with tobacco farmers; I set out not with a hypothesis to prove,
but with a wish to understand not only tobacco farming practices
but the meanings of these practices to farmers during the current
period of transition.10 In part, I have gathered a retrospective history, an accounting of how people today view the past and their connections to it. I quickly understood that these meanings can only
be understood within a context of the public discourses that surround these farmers and their ongoing processes of the generation
of meaning(s). As they talked to me, they were also talking back to
those who argue that tobacco is being replaced by diversified farming, to the perception of tobacco as a thing of the past (as “heritage”),
and of course to those who argue that the crop that they depend
upon is lethal. These and other discourses surrounding tobacco
serve as screens through which tobacco is differently understood.
Kenneth Burke writes: “When I speak of ‘terministic screens,’ I
have particularly in mind some photographs I once saw. They were
different photographs of the same objects, the difference being that
they were made with different color filters. Here something so ‘factual’ as a photograph revealed notable distinctions in texture, and
even in form, depending on which color filter was used for the documentary description of the event being recorded.”11 Tobacco farming (and more important, tobacco farmers) takes on differing, often
competing, textures and meanings dependent on the discursive
screen through which it is considered. My folklore training helps
me to understand how people communicate (with each other, with
me) on the ground; rhetoric helps me to understand the persuasive
work of discourses (both on the ground and seemingly all around, in
more public discourses) and what is included and left out in order
for persuasion to take place. Together, they help me to understand
interactions between multiple domains—rather than attempting to
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separate public from private or cultural practices from how they are
represented in multiple sites.
Of course, my endeavor to understand tobacco farmers within
the context of such public discourses and the changing symbolism of
the crop is just that: my endeavor. In recent decades, ethnographers
in the fields of folklore, anthropology, and others have problematized prior assumptions of the writing of ethnography as an objective enterprise.12 Rather, as ethnographers, we offer interpretations
that are filtered through many screens of our own, both scholarly
and personal. I also came to my fieldwork as an outsider, and I write
as an outsider; this both limits my ability to understand tobacco culture from an insider perspective and affords me the opportunity to
offer an interpretation from the outside looking in. My assemblage
and use of sources from multiple domains—ethnographic, historical,
archival—engenders a dialogic account rather than one that relies
on any one voice.
This book must also be read as specific to the people with whom
I interacted and the region in which they live and work. Geography and climate led to the establishment of distinct tobacco regions
based on the type of tobacco grown. Cultivation methods, labor,
marketing practices, and farm size all vary by region. The historical context of tobacco production is unique to each tobacco region
as well, because tobacco type, farm size, and landscape determined,
for instance, the degree of dependence on slave labor and, later, the
mechanization of tobacco work.13 Central Kentucky has historically
been the center of burley tobacco production, the center of what
is referred to as the Burley Belt; nearly half of Kentucky’s burley
tobacco production has been based in the Bluegrass Region, which
lies at the heart of central Kentucky.14 I began my first interview with
Martin Henson, whom we will meet in chapter 1, with my standard
interview opening. I noted that I was “talking with Martin Henson .
. . in Franklin County, Kentucky, about tobacco.” Martin corrected
me: “Burley tobacco.” Although other types of tobacco are grown
in Kentucky—particularly dark air- and fire-cured tobaccos—burley
has long been both economically and culturally dominant.15 Central Kentucky farmers are not just tobacco growers. They are burley tobacco growers. This book is therefore specifically about the
changed meanings of burley tobacco in central Kentucky as I came
to understand and interpret it based on a combination of ethnographic fieldwork and rhetorical analysis.
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A Narrative of Change
I am indebted to the first tobacco farmer I interviewed as I began
this research in 2005, the late Robert Taylor of Bracken County, in
part because he provided me with the knowledge I needed in order
to ask my future interviewees much more informed questions than
those that I asked him. But he also asked me an important question. Following a driving tour of the Taylor farm that included his
cattle and pastures, his tobacco barns, his garden, and of course his
tobacco crop, we sat down in the living room for an interview and
began with this exchange:
Author: And one of the things that, that you talked about
[during our farm tour] is the different parts of the process?
And I wondered if you could walk me through like a whole
year, you know, what the different . . .
Robert Taylor: Okay, I’ll do my best. Would you rather
have present day or olden days? There’s a whole lot of
difference.
I replied that I wanted him to tell it in the way that he thought it
should be told and that perhaps he might tell me about both.
Mr. Taylor’s question stayed with me, but it was a while before I
realized that he had given me the narrative structure of the story of
tobacco in the early twenty-first century: a narrative woven together
out of threads of change. While most farmers didn’t ask me if I
wanted to hear about “present day or olden days” as Bob Taylor did,
most offered me a comparative narrative that included how things
are done today and how they were done during other periods. Many
also shared both questions and predictions about tobacco’s future.
The tobacco buyout of 2004, which—as I will discuss—ended the
federal tobacco price support program that had been in place since
the New Deal era, is widely understood as a dramatic moment of
change and transition for Kentucky agriculture. Although transition
in its current usage most often refers explicitly to the aftermath of
the buyout, tobacco production can more generally be understood
as tradition-in-process, ever changing, continually transitioning.
This book unravels multiple threads of change within the lifetimes
of present-day tobacco farmers in order to understand how those
threads have been woven together into a complex whole.
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For Kentucky burley tobacco growers, tobacco farming is a livelihood that involves a mastery of traditional skills passed through
generations and adapted to changing circumstances—technological,
economic, social, and political. Over the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, there have been rapid technological changes on the farm, local labor has largely disappeared,
women and men have increasingly found jobs off the farm, the federal tobacco program has ended, acreages have grown—substantially
in some cases—and the buying habits of the tobacco companies have
increasingly moved offshore. During this same period, public awareness of the dangers of smoking has skyrocketed, smoking rates have
plummeted, and smoking in public places has become socially unacceptable and in some places illegal. All of this has led to dramatic
changes in the political, economic, social, community, and even personal meanings of tobacco. According to D. Wynne Wright, “For
public health advocates and social advocates, tobacco is a menace
to public health and welfare—a commodity to be stamped out. For
farmers, tobacco is a health hazard but, at the same time, an economic and social opportunity wrought by a rich historical legacy.”16
The confluence of the changing symbolic and economic valuing of
tobacco must be understood in order to understand the past and
present situation on Kentucky farms and to ensure a healthy farm
economy in Kentucky’s future.
I did not fully understand this for some time.17 I initially assumed
that the narrative of change suggested by Bob Taylor’s question was
about nostalgia for the loss of the old ways of tobacco production.
This in turn reinforced my focus on the cultural and symbolic valuing of tobacco. Farmers set me straight. For instance, Roger Quarles
explained in an interview that tobacco was only one part of his farm
operation. I asked, “But did it—was it important to you to continue
growing some amount of tobacco, despite other opportunities that
you had?” He responded, “Well . . . You gotta understand I never did
particularly love growing tobacco, I did it because it was a business
opportunity.”18 I realized that perhaps I wanted to be told about an
emotional attachment to the crop, not just an economic one. While
many other farmers told me that they do enjoy raising tobacco for a
number of reasons, I was told many times that no matter how much
anybody might enjoy it, no one enjoyed it enough (or was stupid
enough) to keep doing it if it didn’t pay. Farmers taught me over and
over that they continue this tradition because it provides an income.
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Farmers emphasized the economic role of tobacco because as the
crop has become stigmatized, widespread awareness of the presentday economic importance of tobacco to families, communities, and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky is largely gone. I was in the offices
of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture (KDA) one day in the
summer of 2007 for a meeting in preparation for the Kentucky
Folklife Festival, and in a hallway I noticed a display of large, colorful photographs of Kentucky agricultural products. As I scanned the
images, I realized there were no photographs of tobacco. Later I visited the KDA website; there were no images of tobacco there either.
How had tobacco, once so important to the Kentucky agricultural
economy, lauded as central to Kentucky heritage, come to disappear? I wondered. And when had it disappeared? These questions
became a central thread that I sought to unravel.
Today tobacco is widely understood as part of Kentucky’s heritage—the state’s past, not its present. When farmers and I discussed
the importance of documenting this tradition for the historical
record through oral history interviews, they wanted me to know
that tobacco continues to be of economic importance in the present. This connects back to the narrative of change and my assumptions about nostalgia. Farmers cannot simply lament changes within
the tradition of tobacco farming, because such changes have helped
them to raise the crop more efficiently, and they are therefore necessary to their very survival. However, by asserting that tobacco is of
great economic importance, I do not argue that tobacco is not also of
great symbolic importance. Rather, the two are intricately entwined.
There is nostalgia around tobacco production, but it does not necessarily follow the single path that I initially assumed, for, as Ray
Cashman argues, “not all nostalgias are the same.”19 Nostalgia takes
multiple forms depending on the position of the person expressing
it, as I will discuss.
This book is structured in three parts in order to provide a holistic
interpretation of the multiple, changing contexts of tobacco production—changes that are often alluded to but that have not previously
been elucidated and interpreted. In part 1 of the book, I trace the
“thirteen-month” tobacco production cycle based on my fieldwork
with tobacco farmers during the 2007 crop year. The three chapters
in this section provide a first-person account of my interactions in
the field, combined with quotations and paraphrases from recorded
interviews and fieldnotes. I include descriptions of changing cultural

10  B urley

practices and circumstances at each stage of tobacco production,
as they were described to me. Martin Henson, my most important
teacher through the tobacco year, serves as the major guide throughout these chapters, and what I learned from many other participants
in my fieldwork is included in order to demonstrate the diversity of
perspectives and farming operations. This section is not meant to
serve as a comprehensive history of changing farm technologies but
rather to provide farmers’ perspectives on and experiences with the
changes they have seen in their lifetimes. Despite stereotypes of farmers as resistant to change, tobacco farmers have long been accepting of change—when changes prove to be in their economic interest.
Rather than merely mourning the loss of “the olden days,” farmers
understand change and transition as part of the tradition of raising
burley tobacco that includes gains and losses.
In part 2, I examine the changing political context of tobacco
in Kentucky through an analysis of the Kentucky Department of
Agriculture newsletter in order to understand the rhetorical decisions made by the state in response to the changing political status
of the tobacco industry and therefore of tobacco production. What
began as a search for evidence of the inclusion of images of tobacco
production in previous periods in order to find out if the absence
I noted in the KDA offices and on the website was indeed a documentable change led to days and days in the Kentucky Department
for Libraries and Archives reading every issue of the KDA newsletter, from when it began in the 1940s through the period of my
research. I chose to focus on the newsletter because it represents a
purposeful public articulation of the priorities and perspectives of
the state agency most responsible for shaping the image of Kentucky agriculture. As I took careful notes about what was reported
in the newsletters and how this news was framed, the pattern of the
shifting politics of tobacco in different periods emerged. It is for this
reason that, while I set out to write an ethnography, I have ended up
with a book that devotes nearly a third of its pages to the rhetorical
analysis of a single printed source.
As the state’s official agriculture agency, the KDA generates
and promotes the agricultural face of the Commonwealth, and the
newsletter has served as the agency’s primary means of intentional
communication with the public. Along with news, the publication
provides the agency’s—and therefore the state’s—shifting arguments
about what Kentucky agriculture is and should be. Over the second
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half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the KDA’s representation of tobacco evolved from an economically vital crop to a
celebrated symbol of the state’s heritage to a crop replaced by diversified agriculture. By the turn of the new century, tobacco had become
a stigmatized crop, and it was no longer politically expedient to claim
it as important to the economy. Tobacco is now viewed as heritage, a
terministic screen that suggests its economic value is in the past.
Taken together, parts 1 and 2 of this book demonstrate diverging
realities: although tobacco production continues in Kentucky, tobacco
has become a stigmatized crop, and its existence in the present has
largely been erased from public awareness. The occupational and
identity category tobacco farmer has become, for many, a stigmatized
category—what Erving Goffman described as a “spoiled identity.”20
In part 3, I examine aspects of what this means to tobacco farmers.
The combined impact of the technological changes and the changing
status of the crop and those who grow it has affected the traditional
“pride” farmers take in their crop. This is evident in particular expressions of tobacco nostalgia that communicate feelings of loss for a better time of tobacco production, next to the idea that, for some, “now is
the good old days” because of technological innovations and improved
efficiency. Not only was there more pride in tobacco in farmers’
fathers’ and grandfathers’ days, but there was also more respect for
the occupation. Tobacco farmers long not for a return to earlier times
and technologies—which would be economically unfeasible—but for
the pride and respect once associated with a “tobacco-man” identity.
In the final chapter, I examine competing perspectives on the
“transition” in which Kentucky burley farmers find themselves. The
dominant perspective on the future of Kentucky agriculture is that
tobacco production is in its last days and that the “transition” currently taking place is one in which tobacco farmers have replaced,
will replace, or should be replacing tobacco production in favor of
“diversified” agriculture. This rhetoric suggests that simply planting
another crop or raising alternative livestock will lead to the replacement—economically as well as symbolically—of tobacco. This chapter complicates these assumptions, as well as assumptions about the
concept of “tradition,” through a discussion of tangible and intangible challenges to “replacing” tobacco.
In order to establish a historical context for tobacco production today,
it is necessary to provide a brief metahistory of the development of
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the tobacco industry in the United States and Kentucky as it has been
told by past chroniclers. A number of volumes address the history
of tobacco in the United States, at least through the mid-twentieth
century. In providing an overview of this history from commonly
cited works, I am as interested in how the historical narrative has
been told as I am in the history itself. Hayden White has argued that
the historian “emplots” a particular story of history by pulling from
a “chronicle of events” in the historical record.21 These tobacco histories are all similarly emplotted; they hinge on the same historical
events and analogous descriptive passages and end up telling similar
uncritical stories about the role of the crop, those who grow it, and
those who manufacture products with it.22 Following this metahistory, I describe recent events that affect tobacco farmers (essentially
emplotting my own narrative), informed by media accounts, interviews, Extension Service materials, and recent publications.

Burley Tobacco Production: A Metahistory
There are particular events and details that historians of tobacco
repeatedly use to demonstrate the importance of tobacco in the
establishment of the American colonies. Tobacco has been called
“America’s oldest industry” because of its economic role in America before and since the European discovery of the plant upon first
contact with Native Americans, at which time it had long been a
major item of trade between Native American peoples.23 As early as
3000 B.C.E., Native Americans “were smoking tobacco for a variety of ritual, social, and diplomatic purposes as well as for personal
pleasure”24 and were also using the plant for a number of medicinal purposes throughout the Americas.25 Christopher Columbus first
mentioned “dry leaves” that appeared to be of great importance to
the Indians in a diary entry written in 1492,26 although the first gift
of tobacco he received was said to have been thrown overboard since
he and his crew did not know what it was or what to do with it.27
Over the course of the sixteenth century tobacco spread across
Europe, Asia, and Africa “largely through the agency of traders and
sailors who carried the weed and the habit of using it in various
ways throughout the world,” and by 1607 the Spanish had a “virtual
monopoly” on the crop.28 By this time, the English had developed
a “ravenous appetite” for tobacco, despite the admonitions of King
James I, making the cultivation of tobacco under English control
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particularly desirable in order to avoid importation costs.29 The survival of Jamestown, after two failed attempts, is attributed to John
Rolfe’s successful development of the crop,30 opening the way for
further “settlement” of the continent. Rolfe made his first attempt to
grow a crop of tobacco in 1612, and in the year 1618 Virginians raised
twenty thousand pounds.31 By 1664, twenty-four million pounds of
tobacco were being exported from the colonies to England.32
Tobacco warehouses were “one of the first businesses to be regulated” in colonial North America.33 Not only did tobacco help to
fund the American Revolution, but some “argue that the unfavorable terms of trade and heavy debt burden that colonial tobacco
planters had with English merchants and tobacco consignees were
important factors in establishing colonial rebelliousness toward Britain.”34 George Washington raised tobacco,35 and in 1791, during his
first presidential term, tobacco exports totaled $4,359,567, “making
it the nation’s principal export crop.”36 “The tobacco leaf was woven
so deeply into the fabric of American life,” writes historian Susan
Wagner, “that it was used as a motif in the decoration of columns in
the Capitol.”37
In the earliest days of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, receipts
given as proof of stored tobacco “could serve as currency in payment of fees, fines, forfeitures, and debts both public and private.”38
According to John van Willigen and Susan C. Eastwood, “Tobacco is
American. Some farmers see it as a link they have with Native Americans. In some regions of America, tobacco is a historic icon. The
seal of the city of Lexington, Kentucky, has a tobacco leaf on it,”39 as
does the seal of the city of Owensboro and others.
The Development of Kentucky’s Number-One Cash Crop
Europeans learned the basic method of raising a crop of tobacco
from Native Americans, “including the details of proper spacing in
the field, topping and suckering the plants, and the distinctive drying
processes now known as air-curing, sun-curing, and fire-curing.”40
Detailed descriptions of the practices involved in raising a crop of
tobacco have, since the eighteenth century, been central to telling
the story of tobacco. In 1784, British traveler John Ferdinand Smyth
published a two-volume account of his adventures in America that
includes a lengthy description of the process of raising a tobacco
crop in Virginia.41 This description is in many ways consistent with
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methods of tobacco production either as they exist today or at least
as they existed within the lifetimes of current tobacco farmers. This
includes vernacular language that remains in use today and that will
be defined in part 1, such as preparing plant beds, topping and suckering, the use of tobacco sticks in the curing of tobacco, tying cured
tobacco into hands, and storing it in bulks. Curing practices vary
much more widely from then to now, as multiple classes and types
have since been developed, each with its own unique curing method
and structure. However, the basic idea of curing tobacco using heat
and/or air has long been an important step in tobacco production.
A much longer account was provided by William Tatham in his
Essay on the Culture and Commerce of Tobacco, published in 1800
based on his two decades of observation, beginning in 1769 at the
age of seventeen. His account is relevant not only as the most extensive account from the period but because the production and marketing methods that he observed were those that were practiced as
tobacco farmers were beginning to settle in what, in 1792, became
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As planters moved west to what is
now Kentucky, “the broad outline of the cultural technology of Burley leaf had already become established in Virginia and was carried
whole into Kentucky.”42 In addition to farm practices, the complex
system of state control of the sale of the crop was “carried whole”
into the territory.
The system of slavery was also carried into the territory. As early
as 1751, as the territory was being explored, “blacks and whites
entered Kentucky together,”43 and Daniel Boone brought slaves
along on his explorations of the territory in the 1770s.44 The labor
of slaves on colonial plantations is central to the story of tobacco
in American history. Beginning in the late seventeenth century, a
number of factors led to a shift from white immigrant servants to
African slaves in the major tobacco-producing region surrounding
the Chesapeake Bay. By 1700, farmers in the Chesapeake region
were wholly dependent on the labor of slaves in the production of
tobacco.45 According to Joseph C. Robert, a mid-twentieth-century
tobacco historian, tobacco “created the plantation pattern. Its labor
requirements soon meant hordes of African slaves. Present-day rural
and racial problems below the Mason and Dixon Line are rooted in
that first Southern staple, tobacco.”46
With this in mind, the dependence on slave labor seems oddly
missing from Kentucky history as it has been written. This is in part
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due to the fact that “after the Revolution, when nearly all the good
land in piedmont had been taken up . . . dissatisfied poor farmers
had to leave for Kentucky to find greater opportunities.”47 Many of
the farmers who moved to Kentucky and came to depend on tobacco
income were small, poor farmers who did not own slaves; Kentucky’s
was not on the whole a plantation culture. However, as Ann E. Kingsolver notes, the Kentucky historical narrative often ignores Kentucky’s slaveholding past, focusing instead on Kentucky’s status as
a border state during the Civil War, and tobacco “has been glossed
as a family-based cash crop.”48 According to Steven A. Channing in
Kentucky: A Bicentennial History, although “it would be misleading to overlook the feature that most distinguished Kentucky from
the lower South, namely the absence of a substantial number of
very large plantations,” “it is possible to exaggerate the importance
of that comparative difference. Apologists developed a powerful
mystique around it, using that to argue that slavery was relatively
inconsequential.”49 While slavery was a much larger part of the history of the western portion of the state—where the land is flatter
and farms larger, and the culture is often described by Kentuckians
as more “southern”—there were slaves on farms across the state,
including the Bluegrass Region, which became the center of burley
production.
The importance of burley tobacco, which had become dominant in Kentucky as it spread to the central region, grew as chewing tobacco became the most widespread method of consumption in
the United States because burley was a primary ingredient. At this
time, new strains of red burley were being developed, and leaf quality was improving. The move to “chaw” during the first half of the
nineteenth century was fostered in large part by the desire on the
part of Americans to separate themselves from what were seen as
elite and effeminate European ways. As the masculine hero became
the frontiersman, a “man of manly independence,”50 and the “common man” “reigned supreme,” chewing spread up the class ladder.51
Chewing tobacco was the “only one of our tobacco customs which
did not originate in the conscious imitation of European manners.”52
Although tobacco was grown in Kentucky in the early nineteenth
century, it was not until the 1830s, when a canal was built in order
to provide a consistent and safe route around the Falls of the Ohio
at Louisville, that Kentucky began to take its place as a major producer of tobacco as well as hemp.53 Even then, however, tobacco
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production continued to center around the rivers, and very little was
produced in the Bluegrass Region.
By the mid- to late nineteenth century, distinct types of tobacco
with different production practices and uses had settled into particular regions based on climate and soil conditions. Cigar tobaccos
(binders, wrappers, and fillers) remained concentrated in the North
(the Connecticut Valley, small portions of New York and Pennsylvania), as well as small parts of Georgia and Florida. Flue-cured or
bright tobacco became concentrated in the Carolinas and Georgia. Dark fire-cured and dark air-cured tobaccos—used primarily in
chewing tobacco and snuff, as well as pipe tobacco—settled in far
western Kentucky and northwestern Tennessee. According to John
Morgan, the practices that are still used in the production of dark
fire-cured tobacco remain the most consistent with tobacco production of colonial times.54 Burley settled in Kentucky and parts of Tennessee, and Maryland retained its own air-cured type. Today, the
overwhelming majority of burley, Maryland, and flue-cured tobaccos is used in cigarettes. A small region of Louisiana, centered in St.
James Parish, became the home of a particularly specialized type of
pipe tobacco, Perique tobacco.55
According to numerous versions of the tobacco history narrative,
“warfare has been the single most significant influence on the worldwide propagation of a taste” for tobacco.56 The Civil War had both
direct and indirect effects on Kentucky’s move to the top of tobacco
production. In stories told about Union and Confederate soldiers
meeting in the darkness between battles to exchange news and provisions, it is said that Confederate soldiers traded their chewing
tobacco for Union coffee because of the shortages of each in their
respective regions.57 As a result, the northern appetite for chewing
tobacco grew.
The Civil War also shifted the important tobacco regions.
Because Kentucky was a border state, it was largely spared the structural devastation of states that had joined the Confederacy. This
meant that during and after the war, Kentucky tobacco farmers had
a distinct advantage over their counterparts in states such as Virginia and North Carolina, where farms and warehouses had largely
been destroyed, as had centers of marketing and manufacturing.58
Louisville, the center of the market of the West at the time, also
came through the war relatively unscathed, unlike potential competitors such as Nashville, Atlanta, and Birmingham.59 Meanwhile, New
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York became a marketing center for the sale of tobacco produced in
Union states.60 Although Virginia never recovered its former share
of tobacco marketing and manufacturing, North Carolina eventually
did recover and became the nation’s largest tobacco-producing state.
Another development just before the war ended was instrumental in establishing Kentucky’s place in the tobacco industry ever
more firmly—the discovery of white burley. The burley tobacco leaf
that was being grown at the time was a harsh red variety. The story
of white burley—Kentucky burley’s origin narrative—is recounted
in nearly all published histories of tobacco, with an accompanying
explanation that it was one of the rarest of moments in the natural world, called a “sport” or “a sudden deviation from a standard
type.”61
The story goes that the tenants of a Brown County, Ohio, tobacco
producer named Fred Kantz ran out of seed and bought some from
a Bracken County, Kentucky, farmer named George Barkley. The
tenants planted the seeds in their seedbeds, and when it came time
to transplant the plants into the field, they didn’t look right—they
were “dirty yellow in color,” although “sturdy enough”—so they
were destroyed.62 The next year, one of the tenants, George Webb,
planted leftover seeds that grew to become leaf that “cured out to
a handsome, almost golden, light tan or cream leaf.”63 The following year, he raised twenty thousand pounds; the tobacco was praised
by buyers, and it took off and “positively thrived” in the Bluegrass
Region64 beginning in the 1870s.65
Between 1865 and 1929, Kentucky produced more tobacco, by
pound, than any other state.66 White burley required a shorter growing season, the entire stalk could be harvested at once (stalk-cut)
rather than requiring multiple passes through the field harvesting
the leaves as they matured (primed), and it could be air cured rather
than fire cured. It was appealing to manufacturers because it had
characteristics that made it ideal for chewing and pipe tobaccos:
there was less sugar in the leaf, so it absorbed sweeteners that were
added to it for flavoring and that helped it to blend well with other
tobaccos. These characteristics would later make it an essential part
of the American-blend cigarette.
Changes in tobacco marketing took place from the 1830s through
the 1890s, as auctions became “institutionalized,” and farmers began
to move away from packing their tobacco in hogsheads.67 By the
beginning of the nineteenth century, there was growing distrust of
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the “tobacco note” that had long served as the representation of a
hogshead of tobacco as it was bought and sold, and by the 1830s
the auction system was developing as buyers began purchasing
directly from farmers immediately following the inspection of their
tobacco.68 Looseleaf sales were introduced in Kentucky and Tennessee in 1901, replacing sale in hogsheads.69 The practice of packing hands of tobacco onto baskets at the warehouse, rather than in
piles on the floor, was established in Lexington in 190470 and would
remain the standard marketing practice until the early 1980s; even
today, this practice remains the iconic image of the tobacco sale. The
last hogsheads sales in the burley region took place during the 1929–
1930 marketing season in Louisville.71
The Tobacco Trust, Trouble in the Black Patch,
and the Tobacco Program
Tobacco overproduction was identified as a problem immediately
following John Rolfe’s first planting of the crop in Jamestown in
1612, and with the concept of overproduction came governmental
monitoring and intervention. As early as 1613—just the second year
of cultivation at Jamestown—Deputy Governor Thomas Dale feared
yet another failed colony and “ordered that no man could raise
tobacco unless he also each season manured and maintained two
acres of corn.”72 According to William Tatham, as early as 1620 King
James I ordered colonists to limit tobacco production and instead to
plant corn and potatoes and raise livestock,73 and the first legislation
ever passed regarding tobacco commerce, in 1639, addressed the
need to limit tobacco production.74 Overproduction was at the heart
of the 1670s event known as Bacon’s Rebellion, and in 1682 there
were “plant-cutting riots” in which planters cut their own and their
neighbors’ tobacco when the Virginia Assembly refused to impose
production limits.75
While the relationship between farmers and the tobacco industry had been a tumultuous one since the strife between planters and
British merchants, the conflict intensified beginning in the 1870s
as manufacturing became consolidated. Until the late nineteenth
century, tobacco products were largely produced by “country factories”—everyone from merchants to planters produced chew for
sale locally.76 Gradually, cities such as St. Louis and New York, as
well as towns in North Carolina, became centers of manufacturing.
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The American Tobacco Company was established in 1890 “under
the guiding hand of J. B. Duke,”77 the son of a poor planter made
rich through home manufacture and traveling sales of tobacco products beginning just after the Civil War.78 “The Trust,” as it came to
be called, was made up of the largest tobacco manufacturing companies, and it rapidly achieved a monopoly in the industry through
rampant price wars that drove their competitors “not out of business, but into joining the Trust,” which ultimately subsumed over
250 manufacturers.79
The formation of the Trust, along with other factors, resulted in
severe price reductions, and farmers attempted to overcome shrinking farm incomes through increased production. Increased production led to overproduction, which served to drop the prices further.
One result was the “Black Patch Wars,” which most famously took
place in the dark tobacco region of far western Kentucky and Tennessee.80 Dark-tobacco growers experienced the most drastic price
reductions as the demand for their product dropped when domestic
tobacco consumption began to move away from chewing tobaccos
to smoking tobaccos at the end of the nineteenth century. The first
attempt to build a cooperative association to fight the growing power
of the Trust took place in this region in 1904, with what became
the Dark-Fired Tobacco District Planters’ Protective Association of
Kentucky and Tennessee. Alongside this organization, a secret association was formed that became known as the Night Riders. Beginning in 1906, the Night Riders organized themselves “with robes
and masks, and [with an] elaborate paramilitary hierarchy operating as an outlaw underground army” that “coerced reluctant leaf
planters to join . . . flogged still others, dragged plant beds, burned
barns and houses, killed some.”81 They also burned warehouses and
manufacturing facilities in the towns of Princeton and Hopkinsville,
Kentucky.
Although the activities of the Night Riders in the dark-fired
region have been most widely documented, there were similar
movements in central and northern Kentucky as well. The tactics of
the Night Riders in other regions were reportedly “more successful
and somewhat less violent,”82 but oral accounts of violence and murder have been passed through families. The activities of the Night
Riders ended around 1908 in large part because of legal action taken
against them by their victims, but also because by this time public
sentiment had turned against them. In 1911, the Trust was dissolved
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by the US Supreme Court as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890. However, out of the Trust came the “Big Four” companies—American Tobacco Company, Liggett and Myers, Lorillard,
and R. J. Reynolds—and the turbulent times were far from over.
Early twentieth-century cigarettes—a form of tobacco use that
was not yet widespread—were primarily “Turkish-blend” cigarettes.
This blend comprised about 60 percent domestic tobaccos—but not
burley—and 40 percent Turkish tobacco, a type not raised in the
United States. R. J. Reynolds introduced its Camel brand of cigarettes in 1913, and with it and the competing brands that followed
came a cigarette blend that “revolutionize[d] the cigarette field.”83
Though particular blends have been trade secrets over the years, this
“American-blend” cigarette generally included—and still includes—
about 50 to 60 percent flue-cured or bright tobacco, 30 to 35 percent
burley, 10 percent Turkish, and about 2 percent Maryland leaf.84
Camels were followed by the American Tobacco Company’s Lucky
Strikes in 1918 and by Liggett and Myers’s Chesterfields in 1919, all
American blends. With these brands, the companies ushered in the
era of “concentrated one-brand advertising.”85 This new blend also
increased the demand for burley tobacco.
The First World War helped to spread these new cigarettes, and
tobacco prices soared to all-time highs, ranging from twenty-five to
thirty cents a pound.86 This height, however, was followed by a bad
crop year in 1920, and prices plummeted to an average of thirteen
cents a pound in the Lexington burley market. Once again, farmers
were angered and determined to band together in hopes of pressuring the companies for higher poundage prices, and during this
period cooperative associations were formed for each of the tobacco
classes. The Burley Tobacco Growers Co-operative Association was
formed in 1921 with a membership goal of 75 percent of all burley
growers. These efforts were successful for a few years, with prices
reaching over twenty-eight cents a pound in 1922,87 but by 1926 the
efforts were failing, the crop was not cooperatively managed, and
the price dropped back to twelve and a half cents.88 As the Great
Depression hit, not only were prices low, but demand for cigarettes
fell, and by 1931 burley brought about eight and a half cents a pound
and dark-fired three cents.89 Attempts to revive cooperative associations during this period failed.90
With “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s eventful first hundred days of
New Deal legislation” came the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
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(known as the AAA), which “focused on wheat, cotton, field corn,
hogs, rice, milk, and tobacco and provided for restricted production and benefit payments to the farmer.”91 This act was struck down
in 1937, and a new version was passed in 1938;92 various amendments were added over the years. With the passage of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, all tobacco growers were “permitted
to vote through referendum [every three years] to impose production quotas in return for a supported price.”93 The US Department
of Agriculture (USDA) was also charged with creating a system
of inspection and outlining a structure for the uniform grading of
tobacco by government graders through the Tobacco Inspection Act
of 1935,94 which in essence strengthened 1916 and 1929 legislation
by making uniform grading and inspection mandatory at no cost to
the farmer.95 The tobacco program generally stabilized tobacco production for decades, even through times such as the Second World
War, when war once again led to a boom time for tobacco. American
cigarette consumption rose 75 percent between 1939 and 1945,96
and the Second World War spread the American cigarette around
the globe.
Those who had grown tobacco in the years leading up to the passage of the AAA were given a “base” or “allotment”: a precise number of acres or part of an acre of tobacco that could be grown and
sold on each farm without penalty, based on how much had been
raised on that farm in the years prior to the program. This base was
then adjusted annually dependent on the projected demand of the
tobacco companies (both domestic and exports) and the amount of
tobacco in the pool stocks held by the cooperatives, and support
prices were set for each grade. Because tobacco is aged approximately three years before it is used, company estimates were based
on their projected needs three or more years in the future. When
it came time for farmers to sell their tobacco at auctions that took
place at tobacco warehouses, if buyers—either representing specific
tobacco companies or “leaf buyers” who bought tobacco for multiple manufacturers worldwide—were not willing to bid at least a
penny above the support price, then that tobacco went to a “pool”
managed by a grower cooperative. The Burley Tobacco Growers
Co-operative Association was revived in 1941 to manage the burley
pool stocks, paying farmers for tobacco that was not bought at auction with money borrowed from the Commodity Credit Corporation
of the USDA and later paid back with interest when the tobacco
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was sold. Farmers and others on the production end are quick to
point out that unlike other commodity programs, the tobacco program was not a subsidy program, and although there were administrative costs associated with it, the government more than gained
these costs back through interest gained on loans to the pool, a topic
to which I will return.
It has been argued that tobacco production techniques and marketing procedures, unlike those of commodities such as cotton,
changed little as a result of the AAA.97 However, acreage allotments
meant that farmers could sell every leaf of tobacco that they raised
on their allotment, and they therefore resulted in ever-growing average yields through not only the careful collection of each leaf but also
the development of new production techniques and varieties and
the application of new synthetic fertilizers. Average yields tripled
between 1939 and 1971. The research that led to the sharp increases
in yields was described by one longtime Burley Co-op president,
John Berry Sr., as “cruel economics and blind scientific endeavor”
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because higher yields led to more tobacco at lower prices, ultimately
leading to more work for the farmer at lower wages.98 The industry
continued to be plagued by overproduction, and quotas rose and fell
over the years.
In 1971, when there was once again too much burley being raised
and an abundance of tobacco in the pool stocks, growers passed a
referendum that changed the acreage quota system to a poundage
system; at the same time they agreed to a quota reduction.99 This
meant that farmers could plant an unlimited number of acres in
order to raise their poundage quota of cured leaf. This is understood
by many as one link in a chain of events that decreased the care with
which each individual leaf was treated and therefore changed traditional practices designed to preserve the full value of each leaf. 100
Yet during the push for a move from acreage to poundage the Kentucky Department of Agriculture argued that this shift would result
in better-quality tobacco because farmers were overusing fertilizers
in order to get the most out of their allotted acreage.101 However the
shift is interpreted, yields gradually dropped to an average of 2,100
pounds,102 although 3,500 pounds to the acre is not unheard of today.
For most of the years of the program, a tobacco marketing quota
could almost exclusively be obtained through the purchase of land
that came with a quota, which meant that land values were heavily
influenced by the amount of tobacco base that came with a piece
of land. There had long been a sharecropping and tenant system
in which growers engaged in various arrangements, such as on
shares (a relationship in which one farmer raised another’s tobacco
for a share of the crop that varied depending on who supplied the
inputs such as seed, fertilizers, equipment and barns, labor, etc.) or
on halves (a sharing relationship in which the landowner and tenant split the inputs and profits evenly). Beginning in 1971, farmers
could lease quota owned by others; these arrangements also varied,
but by 2004 some paid as much as eighty or ninety cents a pound
to grow someone else’s allotment. Lease costs varied significantly
by county, according to demand, and were highest in central and
western Kentucky.103 This also meant that a class of nonproducing
quota owners was born, so that retired farmers, widows, nonfarmers
who bought a farm that had some quota, and even businesses and
institutions such as schools and churches came to depend on leasing
their tobacco allotments as a source of income. Beginning in 1991,
it was possible to buy quota separate from a parcel of land within
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the county in which you lived.104 The ability to lease or buy quota in
other counties, known as cross-county leasing, was a subject of contentious debate right up to the end of the program in 2004; it was
voted on numerous times by growers and never passed in Kentucky.
The primary argument against cross-county leasing was that it would
benefit only the largest farmers.
Tobacco Threatened
Tobacco use was criticized beginning with first European contact.
King James I published A Counterblaste to Tobacco in 1604, and
when that did not stop the spread of its use throughout England, he
imposed heavy taxes. Movements against tobacco use rose and fell
in the centuries following King James, and the first “significant” antitobacco tract in the United States was published in 1798.105 Wellknown Americans such as Horace Mann, Henry Ward Beecher,
Horace Greeley, Thomas Edison, and Henry Ford were anti-tobacco
proponents, as were the official organizations of Methodists and
Quakers.106 In 1902, the Quakers condemned “the grant of public
money for use in research concerning growing and curing tobacco,”
and despite what had been an ongoing split between northern and
southern Methodists on the issue, in 1914 the Methodist Conference forbade “candidates for the ministry from smoking.”107 Joseph
C. Robert quotes a southern Methodist’s comments in the Reconstruction period: “Those Northern Methodists . . . are engaged in
a general crusade against tobacco. That is our Southern staple, and
our churches are largely supported by it.”108 The movement against
tobacco use in the United States gained momentum in the early
1900s alongside the Prohibition movement.109 Several states banned
the sale and public use of tobacco, and the anti-tobacco movement
even served as the platform of the 1920 presidential campaign of
Lucy Page Gaston, a former member of the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union and a leader in the anti-tobacco movement.110
Widespread public acceptance of the negative health effects of
tobacco finally began to take hold in the 1950s and ’60s. In 1954,
“the first cigarette cancer scare coincided with the introduction of
the modern filtered cigarette,”111 which was actually an improvement
on existing filters. This scare came in the form of a report released by
the American Cancer Society to the American Medical Association,
which was taken quite seriously by the public,112 resulting in a dip
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in sales and in tobacco allotments.113 But the major blow to tobacco
came with the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and
Health. The report, issued on a Saturday to avoid immediate repercussions on the stock market, made a connection between tobacco
use and lung cancer that was taken more seriously by American consumers than any previous expression of belief about the ill effects
of tobacco use.114 It included the statement that “cigarette smoking
is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to
warrant appropriate remedial action.”115 This was followed, in 1965,
by a required warning label on cigarette packages that stated—as a
result of concessions to the tobacco companies—simply that “cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health”116 and a ban on cigarette advertising on broadcast television in 1971.117
Tobacco companies rushed to buy other manufacturing concerns
in order to protect both their image and their finances. Philip Morris led the way, buying up subsidiaries that made everything “from
chewing gum and razor blades to beer.”118 Pro-tobacco associations
had begun to organize in the late 1910s and early 1920s,119 and the
Tobacco Institute—which would become the major lobbying arm of
the tobacco industry—was established in 1958.120 The Council for
Burley Tobacco formed in 1971, because “the challenge of mounting defenses against anti-tobacco attacks promised to be a full-time
job.”121 Taxes were viewed as a threat to the industry perhaps equal
to the growing awareness of health effects, and increased excise
taxes were often successfully fought off. Manufacturers successfully
mobilized growers to fight such fights for them, through active campaigns to tie the interests of farmers with their own interests and put
a sympathetic face on the industry.
Recent Events: The Master Settlement Agreement,
the Tobacco Buyout, and Government Regulation of Tobacco
President Bill Clinton was perceived by many to be “the most antitobacco president in history.”122 He paid a visit to Kentucky in 1998
to meet with farmers, assuring them that “we don’t have to wreck the
fabric of life in your community. We don’t have to rob honest people
of their way of life.”123 In September 2000, the Clinton administration created the President’s Commission on Improving Economic
Opportunity in Communities Dependent on Tobacco Production while Protecting Public Health. The lengthy name reflects the
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complexity of the issues with which it grappled. The commission’s
report, released in May 2001, made a range of recommendations
focused on revamping but not eliminating the tobacco program, providing financial compensation and technical assistance to encourage
growers to diversify their farm operations, and supporting tobacco
cessation programs.124 This commission represented one aspect of a
movement in the 1980s and ’90s to bring public health advocates and
tobacco communities together on those issues that they could agree
upon, such as the economic consequences of a decline of tobacco
markets and working to end youth tobacco use.
The $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), reached
in 1998 between the four largest American tobacco companies and
forty-six state attorneys general, both symbolized and fortified the
change in public attitudes regarding tobacco, as tobacco manufacturers settled with states that sought to recover medical costs associated with smoking-related illnesses. The MSA was the largest
settlement of a civil suit in American history. Florida, Minnesota,
Mississippi, and Texas had made prior, separate settlements totaling
$40 billion. The companies originally sued were Philip Morris, R. J.
Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard; additional companies
signed on subsequent to the original settlement. Kentucky’s participation in this lawsuit itself posed questions. Scott White, a member
of the Kentucky attorney general’s staff, said in an interview for the
Kentucky Oral History Commission in 2000, “But of course tobacco
affects so many different parts of Kentucky’s economy and is grown
in 119 out of our 120 counties. We’ve got a manufacturing plant
in Jefferson County, there’s tobacco warehouses strewn across the
state, I mean, it truly is . . . you know, just part and parcel of who we
are as Kentuckians. And, so we were, we kind of felt like if we were
to sue the cigarette companies, it’d be kind of like Kentucky suing
itself.” Nevertheless, Kentucky participated in the lawsuit.
In addition to the monetary settlement, the industry agreed to
create a fund for the promotion of tobacco prevention and cessation, the American Legacy Foundation, and to “modest restrictions
on advertising and promotion,” including a ban on the use of cartoon characters such as Joe Camel and of billboard advertising and
promotional merchandise.125 In addition, the industry agreed to the
closure of lobbying organizations, including the Tobacco Institute,
and released what amounted to millions of pages of internal industry
documents. Public health advocates had hoped for many additional
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outcomes, including legislative changes such as Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco, stronger warnings on
packaging, and tougher restrictions on the promotion of tobacco
products. According to Allan Brandt, in his critique of the MSA, it
“proved to be one of the industry’s most surprising victories in its
long history of combat with the public health forces.”126
The Master Settlement Agreement resulted in two phases of
monetary awards. Phase I monies are being paid out to states over
twenty-five years, and Phase II monies provided annual payments
to growers in order to compensate them for the expected decline
in demand for tobacco. The payments to farmers ended with the
tobacco buyout, discussed below. Kentucky allocated 50 percent of
the state’s Phase I monies to the support of agricultural diversification through the newly created Kentucky Agricultural Development Board, discussed in chapter 7. The use of Phase I monies by
states has generated widespread criticism in the ensuing years, primarily because so little of the money went to antismoking programs,
as public health advocates had hoped. Many states simply used the
funds to plug holes in their budgets. “The costs of the settlement, as
predicted, were passed on to consumers,” as the major companies
raised their prices in order to cover the costs.127 Some argue that
states are even more dependent on the tobacco industry for revenue
than they were prior to the settlement.128
Meanwhile, farmers were experiencing a tobacco program that
had become a rollercoaster ride. Throughout the late 1990s, quotas
rose and fell dramatically. In 1991, quotas were raised over 20 percent, followed by cuts at or below 10 percent until 1995, when they
began to climb again. In 1999, farmers saw a 29 percent cut, followed
by a 45 percent cut in 2000. Average quota lease prices increased
from under thirty cents in 1997 to nearly seventy cents in 2002,129
as quota owners attempted to maintain their incomes. In the year
2000, Philip Morris established what it called the Tobacco Farmer
Partnering Program, through which it began encouraging growers
to bypass the auction system and contract directly with them, and in
the following years other companies followed their lead. The controversy and uncertainty that came with contracting, combined with
the dramatic quota cuts, served to increase feelings of inevitability
surrounding the demise of the tobacco program. The end of the program came in October 2004.
For over sixty years, the pool stocks maintained by the Burley
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Co-op ensured that growers had a market for their tobacco, and the
guaranteed minimum price ensured, with a few exceptions, that the
price did not drop significantly from one year to the next. However,
support prices also ensured that American tobacco was increasingly
more expensive than tobacco grown in other parts of the world, such
as parts of Africa, South America, and Asia. Between 1970 and 2002,
the portion of burley tobacco imported into the United States for
domestic use grew from 0.6 percent to 48.1 percent.130 While American burley growers were being paid about two dollars a pound prior
to the buyout, producers elsewhere were raising burley for fifty to
seventy-five cents a pound, “maybe up to $1.00/lb in some years
depending on the country as well as the year.”131 The program also
never fully controlled the problem of overproduction, particularly in
bad crop years when unwanted leaf went into the pool in large quantities. This meant that when pool stocks grew excessively large, deals
were struck in which tobacco manufacturers bought out the pool
stocks in exchange for lowered prices and quotas for farmers. The
largest of such buyouts took place in 1985, when farmers accepted a
thirty-cent cut in poundage prices in exchange for an agreement in
which the companies bought the pool stocks over a period of several
years.
During the 1980s and 1990s there were multiple attempts to dismantle the tobacco program, such as an amendment to the 1981
farm bill that came one vote shy of passage. In 1982, “no-net-cost”
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legislation instituted a system of fees, shared between producers and
buyers, to cover the administrative costs of the program in order
to ensure that taxpayers were not supporting tobacco production.132
By the late 1990s, the congressional delegations of Kentucky and
other tobacco-producing states were proposing their own legislative
solutions to the problems plaguing tobacco farmers and the tobacco
industry. By this time, it was clear to all involved that major changes
to the system were needed, although there was little agreement on
what those changes should be, and Congress was working to please
the opposing constituencies of growers, quota owners, manufacturers, and public health advocates. Many proposals were made, some
of which became legislation, some of which did not; in 2002 alone,
nine tobacco buyout bills were introduced in Congress.133
In October 2004, Congress ended the federal tobacco program
with the passage of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act
(within the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004), resulting in “one
of the most dramatic changes in any U.S. agricultural policy over
the last half century, as tobacco now ha[d] the distinction of being
the only government-supported commodity to move abruptly to an
entirely free-market policy.”134 The primary argument for the buyout
was that once there was no longer a support price, the market would
readjust, and manufacturers would buy more American-grown
tobacco. It was also argued that the complicated system of nonproducing quota owners and growers to whom they leased their allotments would be simplified, and growers could accept lower prices
since they would not have to lease in poundage.
The end of the program is referred to as “the buyout” because
quota owners and tobacco growers were entitled to annual payments
for ten years, based on the amount of tobacco grown and/or the
quota owned under the tobacco program. These payments, totaling
$9.6 billion, come from the Tobacco Transition Payment Program,
funded by the major cigarette manufacturers, not from tax dollars,
as many erroneously believe. The purpose of buyout payments was
to compensate growers and quota owners for an anticipated loss of
income, as well as the probable decrease in land values once tobacco
quotas were no longer attached to farms. Presumably, owners would
lose income as they lost the ability to lease their quota, while growers
(whether owners or leasers of quota) would lose income because the
poundage price would drop once the support price was gone. Those
who owned quota at the time of the buyout received payments of $7
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per pound of quota owned in 2002. Growers who had leased other
people’s tobacco quota received $3 per pound grown, and those
who raised tobacco in crop-share arrangements rather than leasing
another farm’s quota straight out received a portion of the grower
payment based on that arrangement (i.e., those who raised on halves
received $1.50 per pound). Many growers were in multiple categories—owning and raising their own quota while also leasing quota
in order to supplement what they owned. As the name—Tobacco
Transition Payment Program—indicates, in addition to its compensatory purpose, the buyout was intended to help tobacco producers
through a “transition,” a term that (as I will discuss in chapter 7) has
come to have multiple meanings.
The tobacco buyout is not a true buyout, because tobacco growers did not sell their quota and with it their right to raise tobacco.135
Although many did get out of tobacco, those who remain now work
in a free-market environment with no poundage limits but also no
support price. The poundage price dropped from about $2 a pound
to around $1.50 the first year after the buyout. For those who were
paying seventy to ninety cents a pound to raise tobacco for $2 a
pound, $1.50 a pound was clearly a better deal even if they continued to rent land, because without the quota land became considerably cheaper to rent. However, there were also many growers
who owned quota—including many who had bought quota after
the law changed to allow them to do so in 1991—and these ownergrowers lost out (although for ten years their buyout payment serves
as at least partial compensation for their losses). The effects of the
tobacco buyout are discussed throughout this book.
A number of the buyout proposals of the late 1990s and early
2000s included the granting of regulatory power over tobacco to
the FDA—something that health advocates had lobbied heavily for
and tobacco companies had long lobbied hard against. Although this
power did not make it into the final buyout legislation, it soon followed. FDA regulation of tobacco had long been a topic of great
contention. When the FDA was created in 1906, the tobacco
industry successfully lobbied for tobacco’s removal from the list of
drugs to be regulated.136 In 1996, the FDA declared that it had the
power to “regulate nicotine-containing tobacco products as medical devices,”137 but in 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that the FDA
did not have the jurisdiction to do so without congressional action.
FDA regulation of tobacco products finally became a reality with
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the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, signed by
President Barack Obama on June 22, 2009. Passage was made possible in large part by the support of Philip Morris, which reversed its
long-standing opposition. Philip Morris, which claims to be conducting research toward “safer” tobacco products, seems to have decided
that FDA involvement will shield it from future litigation. It is the
perception of many—particularly other tobacco companies—that
the limits on tobacco product marketing included in the legislation
will help Philip Morris to protect its control of the cigarette market.
In 2008 Philip Morris split into Philip Morris International (PMI)
and Philip Morris USA (PMUSA), suggesting a connection with its
support of FDA regulation, since presumably PMI, which makes
products for sale abroad, would not be under FDA regulation, while
PMUSA would.138
Farmers have long feared—with the encouragement of tobacco
companies139—that FDA regulation will translate into additional
governmental involvement in on-farm practices. Although the legislation bars the FDA from regulating growers, the regulation of
the content of tobacco products will certainly lead to more intense
regulation—of chemical use and other farming and packaging practices, for instance—of growers by manufacturers. Although growers have long opposed FDA regulation, once it became a reality,
some expressed hope that it will result in an increase in the amount
of domestic tobacco purchased by manufacturers because “foreign
leaf [used in the domestic manufacture of products] will have to
meet the same standards for pesticides as domestic leaf.”140 Whatever tobacco farmers’ feelings may be, FDA regulation adds another
layer of uncertainty about tobacco’s future and the ongoing transition of tobacco production.

Kentucky Burley Tobacco Production Today
As I demonstrate throughout this book, tobacco farming as cultural
practice has been eulogized in the news and by Kentucky authors,
it has been erased from the publications of Kentucky government
agencies, it has been removed from local festivals, and it has been
put on exhibit as a “way of life” of the past. Informal conversations
I have had since I began this research suggest a widespread public
perception that there are very few tobacco growers left.
It is indisputable that US tobacco production is in decline, but
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Number of All US Farms Growing Tobacco, All
Types
Farms Growing
Year
Tobacco (thousands)
1954
512
1959
417
1964
331
1969
276
1974
198
1978
189
1982
179
1987
137
1992
124
1997
94
2002
57
2007
16
Source: US Census of Agriculture, Bureau of the Census,
National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA

Kentucky Farms and Kentucky Farms Raising Tobacco, All Types
Year

Total Number of
Kentucky Farms

Number of Farms
Growing Tobacco

Percentage of Farms
Growing Tobacco

1920

270,626

143,599

53

1940

252,894

126,691

50

1959

150,986

119,970

80

1978

102,263

73,932

72

1992

90,281

59,373

66

2002

86,541

29,237

34

2007

85,260

8,113

10

Source: US Census of Agriculture, Bureau of the Census, National Agricultural Statistics
Service, USDA

the decline is not a new phenomenon. The number of farms growing
tobacco of all types and in all regions of the United States fell from
512,000 in 1954 to 56,977 in 2002.141 Between 2002 and 2007, the
number of farms growing tobacco nationwide dropped from 56,977
to 16,234, although the number of pounds that were raised during
the same period dropped only from about 873 million to 778 million.142 There were nearly 60,000 Kentucky farms on which tobacco
was grown in 1992 and nearly 30,000 in 2002.143 Kentucky tobacco
production dropped over 30 percent in 2005, the year following the
buyout, but the decline in Kentucky burley and dark-fired tobacco
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production was smaller than the decline in areas that specialize
in flue-cured tobacco, such as North and South Carolina and Virginia.144 Kentucky continues to lead in the production of burley and
dark tobaccos, and only North Carolina outranks Kentucky in total
tobacco production.145 However, although Kentucky produced 75
percent of US burley in 2007, this represented just over 15 percent
of the world’s burley, down from 40 percent in 1990.146
A full 50 percent of US tobacco farms are in Kentucky, and in
2007 “the number of farms growing tobacco outnumber[ed] all other
single ag enterprises in Kentucky with the exception of the number
of cattle/hay farms.”147 The 2007 Census of Agriculture revealed that
there were 8,113 tobacco farms in Kentucky that year.148 The census figures, released in February 2009, were somewhat surprising
because there were a couple thousand more tobacco farms than had
been estimated. The remaining number of small tobacco farms was
even more surprising. I was told many times—by former and current
tobacco farmers, extension agents, and others—that tobacco farms
are all becoming large farms. Tobacco farms are becoming “industrial” farms, I was occasionally told by retired and former tobacco
farmers. However, according to the Census of Agriculture, in 2007
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Kentucky and North Carolina Farms Growing Tobacco, 2007
Kentucky
Tobacco Acreage
per Farm
Less than 2 acres

North Carolina

Number of Percentage
Farms
of Farms
957

12

Number of
Farms

Percentage
of Farms

92

4

2.0 to 4.9 acres

2,688

33

212

8

5.0 to 9.9 acres

1,991

25

235

9

10.0 to 24.9 acres

1,687

21

503

19

25.0 to 49.9 acres

497

6

443

17

50.0 to 99.9 acres

221

3

554

21

100.0 to 249.9 acres

69

<1

487

19

3

<1

96

4

8,113

*

2,622

*

250.0 acres or more
Total

Source: US Census of Agriculture, 2007, Bureau of the Census, National Agriculture
Statistics Service, USDA (released in February 2009)
* Totals will not equal 100 percent, due to rounding.

the largest group of Kentucky tobacco growers (33 percent) raised
between 2.0 and 4.9 acres; only 10 percent raised 25.0 or more.149
This is even more startling when compared with North Carolina,
which had just over 2,600 tobacco farms in 2007, with the largest
category in the over-one-hundred-acre range (583 farms).150 A persistent thread throughout this book is an attempt to understand the
discrepancies between public perceptions of the number of tobacco
farmers and census figures, as well as conflicting perspectives on the
future of Kentucky tobacco.
The following exchange took place in early 2008, during an interview
with Jonathan Shell and his grandfather, G. B., with whom I had visited many times over the previous year:
Author: I was asking your granddad what he thought about me
coming down and learning from ya’ll, for really almost a
year—
Jonathan: Well I like it. I hope you romanticize tobacco in your
[book] and you get published; that way people will start
loving it.
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Author: So you think I should romanticize it?
Jonathan: Yeah.
Author: And what does that mean?
Jonathan: Just make it intimate. To where that they can see
that you know, there’s hands that touch this stuff, and that
there’s lives that are dependent on it.
My goal in this book has not been to romanticize tobacco farming,
but I do hope that I have succeeded in demonstrating that “there’s
hands that touch this stuff, and that there’s lives that are dependent
on it.”

